The chain of events that ended in February 1979 with the overthrow of the
Pahlavi regime and the foundation of the Islamic Republic began with the death
in Najaf on October 23, 1977 of Hajj Sayyid Mustafa Khumayni, unexpectedly and
under mysterious circumstances. This death was widely attributed to the Iranian
security police, SAVAK, and protest meetings took place in Qum, Tehran, Yazd,
Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tabriz. Imam Khumayni himself, with the equanimity he
customarily displayed in the face of personal loss, described the death of his
son as one of the “hidden favors” (altaf-i khafiya) of God, and advised the
Muslims of Iran to show fortitude and hope.1
The esteem in which Imam Khumayni was held and the reckless determination of the
Shah’s regime to undermine that esteem were demonstrated once again on January
7, 1978 when an article appeared in the semi-official newspaper Ittila’at
attacking him in scurrilous terms as a traitor working together with foreign
enemies of the country. The next day a furious mass protest took place in Qum;
it was suppressed by the security forces with heavy loss of life. This was the
first in a series of popular confrontations that, gathering momentum throughout
1978, soon turned into a vast revolutionary movement, demanding the overthrow of
the Pahlavi regime and the installation of an Islamic government.
The martyrs of Qum were commemorated forty days later with demonstrations and
shop closures in every major city of Iran. Particularly grave were the
disturbances in Tabriz, which ended only after more than 100 people had been
killed by the Shah’s troops. On March 29, the fortieth day after the killings in
Tabriz was marked by a further round of demonstrations, in some fifty-five
Iranian cities; this time the heaviest casualties occurred in Yazd, where
security forces opened fire on a gathering in the main mosque. In early May, it
was Tehran itself that saw the principal violence; armored columns appeared on
the streets for the first time since June 1963 in order to contain the trend to
revolution.
In June, the Shah found it politic to make a number of superficial concessions -
such as the repeal of the “imperial calendar” -to the forces opposing him, but
repression also continued. When the government lost control of Isfahan on August
17, the army assaulted the city and killed hundreds of unarmed demonstrators.
Two days later, 410 people were burned to death behind the locked doors of a
cinema in Abadan, and the government was plausibly held responsible. On ‘Id al-fitr,
which that year fell on September 4, marches took place in all major cities,
with an estimated total of four million participants. The demand was loudly
voiced for the abolition of monarchy and the foundation of an Islamic government
under the leadership of Imam Khumayni. Faced with the mounting tide of
revolution, the Shah decreed martial law and forbade further demonstrations.
On September 9, a crowd gathered at the Maydan-i Zhala (subsequently renamed
Maydan-i Shuhada’) in Tehran was attacked by troops that had blocked all exits
from the square, and some 2000 people were killed at this location alone.
Another 2000 were killed elsewhere in Tehran by American-supplied military
helicopters hovering overhead. This day of massacre, which came to be known as
Black Friday, marked the point of no return. Too much blood had been spilt for
the Shah to have any hope of survival, and the army itself began to tire of the
task of slaughter.
As these events were unfolding in Iran, Imam Khumayni delivered a whole series
of messages and speeches, which reached his homeland not only in printed form
but also increasingly on tape cassettes. His voice could be heard congratulating
the people for their sacrifices, denouncing the Shah in categorical fashion as a
criminal, and underlining the responsibility of the United States for the
killings and the repression. (Ironically, US President Carter had visited Tehran
on New Year’s Eve 1977 and lauded the Shah for creating “an island of stability
in one of the more troubled areas of the world.”2
As the façade of stability dissolved, the United States continued its military
and political support of the Shah uninterrupted by anything but the most
superficial hesitation). Most importantly, the Imam recognized that a unique
juncture had been reached in Iranian history, that a genuinely revolutionary
momentum had come into being which if dissipated would be impossible to rebuild.
He therefore warned against any tendency to compromise or to be deceived by the
sporadic conciliatory gestures of the Shah. Thus on the occasion of ‘Id al-Fitr,
when mass demonstrations had passed off with deceptive peacefulness in Tehran,
he issued the following declaration: “Noble people of Iran! Press forward with
your movement and do not slacken for a minute, as I know full well you will not!
Let no one imagine that after the blessed month of Ramadan his God-given duties
have changed. These demonstrations that break down tyranny and advance the goals
of Islam are a form of worship that is not confined to certain months or days,
for the aim is to save the nation, to enact Islamic justice, and to
establish a form of divine government based on justice.”3
In one of the numerous miscalculations that marked his attempts to destroy the
revolution, the Shah decided to seek the deportation of Imam Khumayni from Iraq,
on the assumption, no doubt, that once removed from the prestigious location of
Najaf and its proximity to Iran, his voice would somehow be silenced. The
agreement of the Iraqi government was obtained at a meeting between the Iraqi
and Iranian foreign ministers in New York, and on September 24, 1978, the Imam’s
house in Najaf was surrounded by troops. He was informed that his continued
residence in Iraq was contingent on his abandoning political activity, a
condition he was sure to reject. On October 3, he left Iraq for Kuwait, but was
refused entry at the border.
After a period of hesitation in which Algeria, Lebanon and Syria were considered
as possible destinations, Imam Khumayni embarked for Paris, on the advice of his
second son, Hajj Sayyid Ahmad Khumayni, who by now had joined him. Once arrived
in Paris, the Imam took up residence in the suburb of Neauphle-le-Chateau in a
house that had been rented for him by Iranian exiles in France.
Residence in a non-Muslim land was no doubt experienced by Imam Khumayni as
irksome, and in the declaration he issued from Neauphle-le-Chateau on October
11, 1978, the fortieth day after the massacres of Black Friday, he announced his
intention of moving to any Muslim country that assured him freedom of speech.4
No such assurance ever materialized. In addition, his forced removal from Najaf
increased popular anger in Iran still further. It was, however, the Shah’s
regime that turned out to be the ultimate loser from this move. Telephonic
communications with Tehran were far easier from Paris than they had been from
Najaf, thanks to the Shah’s determination to link Iran with the West in every
possible way, and the messages and instructions the Imam issued flowed forth
uninterrupted from the modest command center he established in a small house
opposite his residence. Moreover, a host of journalists from across the world
now made their way to France, and the image and the words of the Imam soon
became a daily feature in the world’s media.
In Iran meanwhile, the Shah was continuously reshaping his government. First he
brought in as prime minister Sharif-Imami, an individual supposedly close to
conservative elements among the ‘ulama. Then, on November 6, he formed a
military government under General Ghulam-Riza Azhari, a move explicitly
recommended by the United States. These political maneuverings had essentially
no effect on the progress of the revolution. On November 23, one week before the
beginning of Muharram, the Imam issued a declaration in which he likened the
month to “a divine sword in the hands of the soldiers of Islam, our great
religious leaders, and respected preachers, and all the followers of Imam Husayn,
Sayyid al-shuhada’.” They must, he continued, “make maximum use of it; trusting
in the power of God, they must tear out the remaining roots of this tree of
oppression and treachery.” As for the military government, it was contrary to
the Shari’ah and opposition to it a religious duty.5
Vast demonstrations unfurled across Iran as soon as Muharram began. Thousands of
people donned white shrouds as a token of readiness for martyrdom and were cut
down as they defied the nightly curfew. On Muharram 9, a million people marched
in Tehran demanding the overthrow of the monarchy, and the following day,
‘Ashura, more than two million demonstrators approved by acclamation a
seventeen-point declaration of which the most important demand was the formation
of an Islamic government headed by the Imam. Killings by the army continued, but
military discipline began to crumble, and the revolution acquired an economic
dimension with the proclamation of a national strike on December 18. With his
regime crumbling, the Shah now attempted to co-opt secular, liberal-nationalist
politicians in order to forestall the foundation of an Islamic government.
On January 3, 1979, Shahpur Bakhtiyar of the National Front (Jabha-yi Milli) was
appointed prime minister to replace General Azhari, and plans were drawn up for
the Shah to leave the country for what was advertised as a temporary absence. On
January 12, the formation of a nine-member regency council was announced; headed
by Jalal al-Din Tihrani, an individual proclaimed to have religious credentials,
it was to represent the Shah’s authority in his absence. None of these maneuvers
distracted the Imam from the goal now increasingly within reach. The very next
day after the formation of the regency council, he proclaimed from Neauphle-le-Chateau
the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution (Shaura-yi Inqilab-i
Islami), a body entrusted with establishing a transitional government to replace
the Bakhtiyar administration. On January 16, amid scenes of feverish popular
rejoicing, the Shah left Iran for exile and death.
What remained now was to remove Bakhtiyar and prevent a military coup d’état
enabling the Shah to return. The first of these aims came closer to realization
when Sayyid Jalal al-Din Tihrani came to Paris in order to seek a compromise
with Imam Khumayni. He refused to see him until he resigned from the regency
council and pronounced it illegal. As for the military, the gap between senior
generals, unconditionally loyal to the Shah, and the growing number of officers
and recruits sympathetic to the revolution, was constantly growing. When the
United States dispatched General Huyser, commander of NATO land forces in
Europe, to investigate the possibility of a military coup, he was obliged to
report that it was pointless even to consider such a step.
Conditions now seemed appropriate for Imam Khumayni to return to Iran and
preside over the final stages of the revolution. After a series of delays,
including the military occupation of Mehrabad airport from January 24 to 30, the
Imam embarked on a chartered airliner of Air France on the evening of January 31
and arrived in Tehran the following morning. Amid unparalleled scenes of popular
joy - it has been estimated that more than ten million people gathered in Tehran
to welcome the Imam back to his homeland – he proceeded to the cemetery of
Bihisht-i Zahra to the south of Tehran where the martyrs of the revolution lay
buried. There he decried the Bakhtiyar administration as the “last feeble gasp
of the Shah’s regime” and declared his intention of appointing a government that
would “punch Bakhtiyar’s government in the mouth.”6 The appointment
of the provisional Islamic government the Imam had promised came on February 5.
Its leadership was entrusted to Mahdi Bazargan, an individual who had been
active for many years in various Islamic organizations, most notably the Freedom
Movement (Nahzat-i Azadi).
The decisive confrontation came less than a week later. Faced with the
progressive disintegration of the armed forces and the desertion of many
officers and men, together with their weapons, to the Revolutionary Committees
that were springing up everywhere, Bakhtiyar decreed a curfew in Tehran to take
effect at 4 p.m. on February 10. Imam Khumayni ordered that the curfew should be
defied and warned that if elements in the army loyal to the Shah did not desist
from killing the people, he would issue a formal fatwa for jihad.7
The following day the Supreme Military Council withdrew its support from
Bakhtiyar, and on February 12, 1979, all organs of the regime, political,
administrative, and military, finally collapsed. The revolution had triumphed.
Clearly no revolution can be regarded as the work of a single man, nor can its
causes be interpreted in purely ideological terms; economic and social
developments had helped to prepare the ground for the revolutionary movement of
1978-79. There was also marginal involvement in the revolution, particularly
during its final stages when its triumph seemed assured, by secular,
liberal-nationalist, and leftist elements. But there can be no doubting the
centrality of Imam Khumayni’s role and the integrally Islamic nature of the
revolution he led. Physically removed from his countrymen for fourteen years, he
had an unfailing sense of the revolutionary potential that had surfaced and was
able to mobilize the broad masses of the Iranian people for the attainment of
what seemed to many inside the country (including his chosen premier, Bazargan)
a distant and excessively ambitious goal. His role pertained, moreover, not
merely to moral inspiration and symbolic leadership; he was also the operational
leader of the revolution. Occasionally he accepted advice on details of strategy
from persons in Iran, but he took all key decisions himself, silencing early on
all advocates of compromise with the Shah. It was the mosques that were the
organizational units of the revolution and mass prayers, demonstrations and
martyrdom that were - until the very last stage - its principal weapons.
* Imam Khomeini: A Short Biography. By: Hamid Algar. Published by: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works (International Affairs Department)
1- Shahidi digar az ruhaniyat,
Najaf, n.d., p. 27.
2- New York Times, January 2, 1978.
3- Sahifa-yi Nur, I, p. 97.
4- Sahifa-yi Nur, II, p. 143.
5- Sahifa-yi Nur, III, p. 225.
6- Sahifa-yi Nur, IV, pp. 281-6.
7- Sahifa-yi Nur, V, p. 75.